Hogan Lovells·CORPORATE / M&A

Delaware Court Sets High Bar to Allege 'Control Group' in M&A

The Delaware Court of Chancery reinforced the high pleading standard for alleging a "control group" in a take-private merger, holding that a fully informed, uncoerced stockholder vote cleansed the transaction of director-level conflicts.

The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a shareholder class action challenging the take-private acquisition of KnowBe4. Plaintiffs alleged that two institutional investors and the CEO, who collectively agreed to roll over a portion of their equity, formed a "control group" that subjected the deal to Delaware’s stringent entire fairness standard of review. Chancellor Kathaleen McCormick, however, found the plaintiffs failed to plead an "actual agreement to work together" beyond parallel economic interests, reinforcing the high bar for such claims.

The decision is a key marker for M&A and corporate litigation counsel, affirming that the adoption of procedural safeguards like an independent special committee and a majority-of-the-minority stockholder vote does not concede the existence of a conflicted controller. The court also held that even assuming director-level conflicts existed, these were "cleansed" by a fully informed, uncoerced stockholder vote, triggering the deferential business judgment rule. The ruling underscores the value of a robust and well-documented special committee process, including quarantining conflicted parties from negotiations, as a powerful defense against fiduciary duty claims in conflicted transactions.

delaware-chancerycorporate-governancemergers-acquisitionstake-privatecontrolling-stockholderfiduciary-dutyspecial-committeecorwin
Read the original firm alert → Thursday, September 3, 2026

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