EU General Court Booking/Etraveli ruling raises merger risk for dominant firms
The General Court's Booking/Etraveli judgment tightens how dominance is shown in network-effect industries, giving complainants a stronger route to challenge concentrated mergers.
Alston & Bird's European antitrust team reports that the EU General Court's ruling in the Booking/Etraveli case may raise the risk of blocked mergers for dominant companies operating in industries defined by network effects. As described in the source, the significance concerns how dominance and market power are established and sustained where a platform's position rests on two-sided network effects rather than conventional switching costs or market-share arithmetic.
Why sophisticated counsel should care: network-effect markets are precisely those where a dominant incumbent is most likely to acquire a nascent rival, and where authorities most often challenge. If complainants' theory of dominance evidence gains traction, expect parallel theories to appear in transactional challenges, in national proceedings, and in strategic joint-venture and interoperability disputes spanning several jurisdictions.
Practical actions: for acquirer-side risk in platform and network industries, teams should re-test the evidentiary record on dominance, examine whether data, network and multi-homing evidence can now be deployed more effectively by complainants, and revisit conditions, remedies and timing risk in merger filings. Watch for an appeal to the Court of Justice and any Commission or authority response. The source is one firm commentary, so counsel should read the judgment's operative reasoning directly before relying on it.